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Abstract
In the present era of ubiquitous digitalization, security is a concern for everyone. Despite enorm-
ous efforts, securing IT systems still remains an open challenge for community and industry. One
of the main reasons is that the variety and complexity of IT systems keeps increasing, making
it practically impossible for security experts to grasp the full system. A further problem is that
security has become an interdisciplinary challenge. While interdisciplinary research does exist
already, it is mostly restricted to collaborations between two individual disciplines and has been
rather bottom-up by focusing on very specific problems.
The idea of the Dagstuhl Seminar was to go one step back and to follow a comprehensive
top-down approach instead. The goal was to identify the “biggest failures” in security and to get
a comprehensive understanding on their overall impact on security. To this end, the Dagstuhl
Seminar was roughly divided into two parts. First, experienced experts from different disciplines
gave overview talks on the main problems of their field. Based on these, overlapping topics
but also common research interests among the participants have been identified. Afterwards,
individual working groups have been formed to work on the identified questions.
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General Introduction
In the present era of ubiquitous digitalization, security is a concern for everyone. Consequently,
it evolved as one of the most important fields in computer science. However, one may get
the impression that the situation is hopeless. Nearly on a daily basis, reports of new security
problems and cyberattacks are published. Thus, one has to admit that despite the huge
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efforts continuously invested since many decades, securing IT systems remains an open
challenge for community and industry.
One of the main reasons is that the variety and complexity of IT systems keeps increasing,
making it practically impossible for security experts to grasp the full system. This results
into the development of independent and isolated security solutions that at best can close
some specific security holes. Summing up, security requires to solve an increasing number of
inter- and intradisciplinary challenges while current approaches are not sufficiently effective.
The aim of this seminar was to gain an interdisciplinary view on security and to identify new
strategies for comprehensively securing IT systems.
Goals
The goals of the seminar was to address the following main challenges and to commonly
discuss solution strategies:
Challenge 1: Interdisciplinarity The topic of security is getting more and more complex and
already understanding the state-of-the-art within one discipline is highly challenging. This
makes it practically impossible to understand the problems and constraints from other
disciplines. Moreover, different disciplines often have their own methods and ”culture”.
From our experience, working with colleagues from other disciplines requires at the
beginning an enormous effort to understand each other. The complexity grows even
further when more than two disciplines are involved.
Challenge 2: Variety of Problems In each discipline, a variety of problems do exist. Natur-
ally, researchers have to single out specific problems that they work on instead of aiming
for comprehensive solutions. The selection of problems usually depends on several factors,
e.g., background of the researcher, topicality of the subject, etc. Most often, researchers
aim for solving very specific problems rather than coming up with more comprehensive
solutions. Moreover, the selection is driven by interdisciplinary factors.
For sure, interdisciplinary research does exist already. However, it is mostly restricted
to address very few disciplines and has been rather bottom-up by focusing on very specific
problems. Instead, the scope of the seminar was to aim for a broad top-down approach. To
this end, the focus was on the following questions:
What are the main recurring reasons within disciplines why security solutions fail, i.e.,
the biggest failures? (Top View)
How do these failures impact solutions developed in other sub-disciplines? (Broad View)
What are possible strategies to solve these problems?
Structure
The seminar was structured accordingly. Before the seminar, a survey was conducted where
the participants have been asked, what they consider to be biggest failures in security.
The list of participants was composed of experts from different, selected sub-fields who
were encouraged to explain the main challenges in their field to the audience. Here, ample
opportunities for discussions have been provided. That is, instead of having many different
talks back-to-back, we had several overview talks from different fields within the first few days.
Afterwards, the whole audience commonly identified three topics to be further investigated
in separate working groups:
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1. The process and role of certifications
2. The human factor in security
3. The education of the society in security
These subgroups met in parallel and worked on specific questions. The remaining days
were composed of workgroup meetings and individual talks. At the end of the seminar, the
workgroups reported to the whole audience their findings.
This report summarizes the finding of the survey (Section 3), the topics of the individual
talks (Section 4), and also the findings of the individual workgroups (Section 5).
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3 Survey Results
In order to prepare and to kick-off the seminar, an online survey was distributed to all
participants. It mainly contained two questions:
1. What is the one biggest failure in security? Please explain why you selected this one as
the biggest one.
2. Which other failures in security should be considered?
The Survey was filled out by 17 participants (3 from industry and 14 from research
institutions). Participants have on average 21 years of past experience in security (with min.
13 and max. 36 years).
The open-ended text answers were analysed by two researchers. The answers were
clustered and six main and five smaller themes were identified. For the analyses, it was
decided not to distinguish between answers of both categories as several participants provided
more than one failure in their response to question 1 and some provided more than two
failures in their answers to question 2. Though, in the following when we provide quotes,
those in italic are those taken from answer to question 2.
In the following the identified main themes are introduced and quotes are provided:
Theme 1: Lack of Holistic Approach for Complex Systems
Several answers were related to various aspects of (not) ideal approaches taken throughout
the development of systems which need to be secured against attacks. Example quotes are:
. . . without adequate consideration of the importance of holistic design . . .
. . . [systems] are too complex to be well-understood . . .
. . . boundaries of a system get more and more fuzzy . . .
. . . mechanism provides a solution for a very dedicated security challenge, one can often
not exclude the existence of . . . other security holes . . .
. . . involve multitude of disciplines . . .
. . . across disciplinary boundaries . . .
. . . quality of risk modeling . . . as a whole is . . . poor
. . . list of assumptions for the overall system are not clear
Making tradeoffs that overfocus on providing security to undifferentiated large scale
groups rather than numerically smaller demographics
Theme 2: Lack of Usability
Several participants mentioned human related aspects wrt. security mechanisms. Note, the
number of answers assigned to this one was higher than for all the other themes. Example
quotes are:
. . . Not designing security with the Human Factor in mind – solutions with too much
workload, complexity. Users are being set up to fail, . . .
. . . Implementing more ideal security features with complicated procedures rather than
usability . . .
. . . usability is another central issue . . . security mechanisms should operate “invisible”
. . . mechanisms complicated or impacting usability negatively . . .
Overload of IT users, e.g. requesting to memorize > 10 passwords.
. . . failure of organizations to appreciate the interplay between usability and security,
driving usability underground, and compromising security . . .
. . . which leads to the . . . question of usability of security mechanisms . . .
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. . . why is security sometimes at perceived as trading off usability . . . ?
. . . Lack of empirical testing of effectiveness of security measures.
Lack of user friendly identity management infrastructure.
The lack of . . . unobservable communications usable by normal citizens
Theme 3: Not Learning from Past Mistakes
Several participants provided answers indicating that the community does not learn from
past failures. Example quotes are:
. . . how we do not seem to learn from our mistake . . .
. . . never seeming to learn from old mistakes. . . .
.. Incapability or inconsequence to learn from failures sustainably . . .
. . . We patch it and learn about it on one system . . . but when there is a shift to
something new, similar . . . vulnerability pops up again . . .
. . . but many mistakes by programmers are long known and could easily be prevented . . .
. . . lack of education where a new generation is doing the old mistakes . . .
. . . we continue doing things just because that’s the way we’ve always done them . . .
Theme 4: Decision Makers Not Taking (appropriate) Actions
Several participants mentioned various types of decision makers (related to law and politics)
in the failures they see. Example quotes are:
. . . we have been slow to update laws to reflect our technology, and slow to appreciate
the impact of technology on legal protections . . .
.. Governments take a hands-off approach, and let organizations scale up until it becomes
difficult to change . . .
. . . lack of attention by decision makers, until sth. major happens . . .
. . . Companies are rarely rewarded for building reliable systems . . .
. . . [accept] convenient and cheap solutions that lead to major . . . problems later.
. . . it seems to widely accepted that companies have outsourced security updates to the
users. Users need to spend time and sometimes money . . . to fix shortcomings of the
systems they are using.
. . . lack of regulations from the onset. Anyone can write, publish/sell an app – other
sectors require a clear process . . .
Theme 5: Lack of Appropriate Certification Concepts
Answers related to certification and standardisation were assigned to this theme. Example
quotes are:
. . . lack of certification concepts for the security and privacy of products and services
that scale to the needs of agile development and cloud delivery . . .
. . . the question of suitable criteria for cloud based, agile software is not addressed at all
in the discussions . . .
. . . failure of standards bodies . . . to make certificate infrastructure work properly . . .
Not understanding the degree of accuracy required, leading to high failure rates.
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Theme 6: Lack of End User Protection
Several answers focused on the general inability of protection end user / consumers adequately.
Example quotes are:
. . . lack of protection of consumers against malware . . .
. . . lack of robust online identities . . .
The inability . . . to provide consumers with a reasonable &reasonably ICT device for
day-to-day tasks –the digital . . . Golf to use a car-market analogy
Protecting humans from bad decisions. Why are systems designed in a way that a user
can damage the whole system just by opening a link or an attachment of a mail? . . .
“Solutions” which place the risk at the weak parties . . .
Smaller but more specific themes
The following specific failures have been mentioned (note, only those provided by at least
two participants are mentioned)
Unsecure programming language (3)
Phishing is still among the major causes of breaches (2)
Passwords are still around (2)
Issues related to machine learning (2)
Web browsers becoming an execution environment for everything (2)
Overall, the result of this survey allowed us to make all seminar participants aware of the
wide range and level of abstraction of failures one can think of. The result helped us also to
group in working groups.
4 Overview of Talks
4.1 DDoS Still Challenging 20 Years Later
Sven Dietrich (City University of New York, US)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Sven Dietrich
We provide an overview of the fundamental flaws that have contributed to allowing the
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) phenomenon [1, 2] to happen over the last 20 years. This
includes design flaws for the Internet and its protocols, management decisions, and sometimes
faulty defensive stances. We show that the imprecision of the DDoS problem itself contributed
(and still contributes) to the difficulty in responding to it. Incremental fixes have only created
good albeit partial solutions to subproblems of the DDoS phenomenon. Defense mechanisms
have varied from attack source identification, volumetric attack detection, network puzzles,
pushback from target-resident detection, and command-and-control detection, and graph-
based analysis for botnets [6]. The migration of attack sources over the years from government
or university owned computers, to broadband-connected home computer systems and most
recently Internet-of-Things devices shows the active continuation of the DDoS phenomenon
and our inability to completely suppress the problem [7]. Repeated calls for an overhaul of
the Internet, allowing for improvement and better flexibility in addressing the DDoS problem,
have been stalled over the years, even though some good starting points for next-generation
network infrastructures do exist [4, 3], but many challenges remain to be solved.
Frederik Armknecht, Ingrid Verbauwhede, Melanie Volkamer, and Moti Yung 9
References
1 Jelena Mirković, Sven Dietrich, David Dittrich, and Peter Reiher. Internet Denial of Service:
Attack and Defense Mechanisms. Pearson, USA, 2004.
2 CERT. Results of the Distributed Systems Intruder Tools Workshop. Published December
7, 1999.
3 Marc C. Dacier, Sven Dietrich, Frank Kargl, Hartmut König. Dagstuhl Seminar 16361:
Network Attack Detection and Defense: Security Challenges and Opportunities of Software-
Defined Networking, September 2016.
4 Marc Dacier, Hartmut König, Radoslaw Cwalinski, Frank Kargl, Sven Dietrich. Security
Challenges and Opportunities of Software-Defined Networking. IEEE Security & Privacy
15(2):96–100 (2017).
5 David Dittrich, Sven Dietrich. P2P as botnet command and control: a deeper insight,
in Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Malicious and Unwanted Software
(Malware), pp. 46–63, October 2008.
6 Baris Coskun, Sven Dietrich, Nasir Memon. Friends of an enemy: identifying local members
of peer-to-peer botnets using mutual contacts. In Proceedings of the 26th Annual Computer
Security Applications Conference (ACSAC), pp 131-140. Austin, TX, December 2010.
7 Sven Dietrich. Cybersecurity and the Future. IEEE Computer 50(4): 7 (2017)
4.2 Research Directions for a Safer Europe
Fabio di Franco (ENISA – Attica, GR)
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Europe should become “a global leader in cybersecurity by 2025, in order to ensure the trust,
confidence and protection of our citizens, consumers and enterprises online and to enable a free
and law-governed internet”, as stated at the Tallinn Digital Summit in September 2017. The
focus of the report is to highlight and recommend how focussed R&D can address emerging
challenges that might pose a severe risk to our society. A key element is the recognition
that the world is moving digitally and fast. The speed of adoption of new technologies has a
potentially huge benefit resulting in increasing productivity, but at the same time may also
pose risks if the technology where used against the best interests of society. Social norms
take dozens of years to develop and the digital transformation is creating an increasingly
blurred distinction between the digital and the physical world. In the digital world, a small
number of corporations, popularly referred to as Internet giants , are increasingly required to
service the societies of the 21st century. However, this requires a barter between the user’s
data and the internet giants’ services: the users allow the digital platforms to track their
location, record their interests and monitor their online activities in return for a wide series
of services demanded by the users. In almost all cases, there is no direct user interaction in
the bartering system, or only to the extent that the user understands the meaning of data
collection notices. orted):
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4.3 Attacker Models and Assumption Coverage
Felix Freiling (Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, DE), Frederik Armknecht
(Universität Mannheim, DE)
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In his seminal paper on “failure mode assumptions and assumption coverage” [1], David
Powell defines several central concepts:
1. The notion of failure mode assertions, i.e., precise statements about the way in which
certain components may fail in the time domain and the value domain.
2. The failure mode implication graph, i.e., a lattice induced by the combination of failure
modes defining the partial order between different composed failure modes.
3. The notion of assumption coverage, i.e., the probability that the assertion defining the
assumed behavior of a component proves to be true in practice conditioned by the fact
that the component has failed [1, p. 391].
The goal of this discussion session was to reflect on the similarities and differences between
safety and security regarding attacker assumptions and assumption coverage and to ask
whether any related work and concepts exist. Safety was understood here as the area of fault-
tolerance and dependability, whereas security was understood as the area of cryptography.
The connection to the title of this Dagstuhl seminar was the fact, that one of the biggest
failures in security appears to be the fact that we do not learn sufficiently from other areas.
Regarding the concept of attacker assumptions, our observation was that in safety attacker
assumptions are usually fixed for a specific scenario and in this scenario often empirically
measurable. Examples are failure rates of components or maximum frequency of bitflips on
communication lines or in memory. The mechanism, with which a component attempts to
tolerate these problems, has no influence on the assumption coverage.
In security, the attacker assumption is usually determined by a domain expert and
must be regularly checked whether it is still correct. It can even change spontaneously. In
circumstances where this is expected to happen, issues of risk management arise. Furthermore,
security mechanisms can have an effect on attacker behavior:
either a strong mechanism deters attackers and makes the system uninteresting compared
to others,
or a weak mechanism is circumvented easily with minimal effort.
In safety we have concepts like graceful degradation and stabilization. On the one hand,
graceful degradation means that the level of violation of specification is proportional to the
strength of failure behavior. On the other hand, stabilization refers to a temporary violation
of a safety property if attacker assumption is violated, and a return to safety property when
attacker assumption is satisfied.
In security, the attacker assumption is usually a worst-case attacker assumption. Interme-
diate levels of attackers are unusual. Also switching between different security mechanisms
is unusual and it is unclear on what basis the switch should occur since many violations of
confidentiality and integrity are undetectable.
In the discussion, people from security admitted that worst-case assumptions usually are
prefered, but often also weaker assumptions are used, so the cryptography community does
not really live up to this claim of always choosing worst-case assumptions.
It was also mentioned that testing has strong similarities to transient attacks that try to
throw a single machine off the tracks, and that stabilization has similarities to the mechanisms
used to tolerate denial-of-service attacks.
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4.4 Values in Computing – a Short Talk
Lucy Hunt (Lancaster University, GB)
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Values in Computing (ViC) is about understanding how human values influence software
production and transforming the way values are considered in software industry practices,
policy making and education. With the increasing number of high impact technology breaches
and failures, we need computing professionals equipped to understand what human values are
and what social responsibility means. To this end, we need to help create more resilient, secure
and less vulnerable software systems that are mindful of the wider ethical, social and human
impact of what their technology does or could do. ViC has a body of research establishing a
framework for the systematic investigation of human values in software production and a
website to disseminate our work (www.valuesincomputing.org ).
How can software (security) incident story-telling be used to improve SE industry and
education practices?
4.5 DRM and Security – A Big Failure?
Stefan Katzenbeisser (Universität Passau, DE)
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In the talk we discuss the evolution of Digital Rights Managenent techniques, which were
proposed to secure online content. The key idea was to encrypt content and transmit the
encryption key in a special license. The failure of DRM can be tracked down to technical
issues (such as the absence of trusted hardware at that time), changes in the business model
(such as the uprising of flatrate streaming media) and usability problems. Media security
tried to fill this gap by marking distributed media invisibly. Still, the fundamental different
nature of analog signals led to numerous problems (such as robustness issues and conflicts
in dispute resolution). Nevertheless, the techniques developed in the area of media security
nowadays play a significant role in the construction of covert channels.
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4.6 Failures in TLS Implementations
Olivier Levillain (Télécom SudParis – Evry, FR)
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In the recent years, we saw a lot of implementation bugs in SSL/TLS stacks, ranging from
classical programming errors to parsing bugs, cryptographic issues and state machine flaws.
In many cases, similar problems were found in different independent implementations. Maybe
the root cause of the problem is not only the developers’ lack of skills. On the contrary, it
might be time to use better languages and better development methodologies, as well as to
improve the specifications we produce. Regarding this last point, we discuss what TLS 1.3
can/will bring to improve the situation.
4.7 Human Involvement in Highly Automated Systems: Human
System Integration in Security
Joachim Meyer (Tel Aviv University, IL)
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The security of systems depends to a large extent on the actions of the humans who interact
with the technology. Human actions can introduce threats, but they can also help to mitigate
risks. Humans are often supported by automation that provides them with advice on
decisions, guides their actions, blocks alternatives, and may automatically perform acts that
are deemed necessary. The talk addresses the question of human-systems integration in the
context of automation, presenting four different ways in which humans can be involved in
systems (humans receive advice, humans supervise automation and intervene in certain cases,
humans supervise automation and set parameters, and maintaining “meaningful human
involvement” without specifying its nature). Quantitative models and empirical results for
the different types of involvement are shown, and some implications for system design are
discussed.
4.8 The Biggest Failures to “Protect” You in the Internet
Vasily Mikhalev (Universität Mannheim, DE)
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Today, personal data is among the most important resources which is being collected by
some governments and big organizations. This data can be used for many different purposes
including targeted advertising and even targeted propaganda. The existing technologies which
are based on the combination of data science methods together with better understanding of
human brain allow for “hacking” human beings using their personal data collected from the
internet and for manipulating people’s emotions. In this talk, we discuss the “protection”
measures that Russian government has implemented in order to increase the security of
citizens and why most of these measures appeared to be the biggest failures.
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4.9 Relation of Business Models to Security (Failures)
Sebastian Pape (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, DE)
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When looking at the usability of current systems, we can note systems often leave the users
in (potentially) dangerous situations. In theory, it should not be possible to brick a system
or get infected by malware when reading mails or working on office documents. Many of
the features are used by a small number of users or not appropriate for the tool leaving
users in a state with lots of rules what they should do (do not click on embedded links, do
not open attachments, do not activate macros, . . . ). As a consequence, users are used to
do ‘strange things’ for the sake of security. This can be exploited by dark patterns and
companies make use of it by their business models. For example when companies blame
hackers for outage or simply security failures, outsource consequences of bad security (e.g.
malwertising, insecure IoT devices) and effort (correction of false positives, e.g. in malware
detection), and obfuscate business goals with security (e.g. when asking for phone numbers
for two factor authentication, but inadvertently used them for advertising).
The result of that is a downward spiral where users have the feeling that they need to do
‘strange things’ for the sake of security which can be exploited by companies to ask them to
obey ‘strange orders’ pretending to improve the users security. Which again increases the
users feeling that they need to do ‘strange things’ for security reasons.
4.10 Memory Corruption Vulnerability Exploitation and Mitigations
Michalis Polychronakis (Stony Brook University, US)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Michalis Polychronakis
In this talk I will present our work on generating self-specializing software that i) reduces
its attack surface by removing unneeded code and logic according to mission-specific or
end-point-specific configurations and dependencies, and ii) shields itself against exploitation
by retrofitting specialized protection mechanisms, such as code randomization and data
isolation. Endpoint-specific specialization is facilitated by a novel binary code transformation
framework that relies on compiler-rewriter cooperation to enable fast and robust fine-grained
code transformation on endpoints, while achieving transparent deployment by maintaining
compatibility with existing software distribution models.
4.11 Trusted Computing: The Biggest Failure or Opportunity?
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi (TU Darmstadt, DE)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
After years of research in hardware security, we are still missing adequate solutions to
protect modern computing platforms. Deployed hardware solutions like PUFs, TPMs, and
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are lacking widespread usage, or have been attacked
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through various side-channels. Additionally, we are witnessing a shift towards cross-layer
attacks, exploiting hardware vulnerabilities from software, also remotely, as demonstrated
recently by attacks like CLKScrew, Meltdown, and Spectre, which affect even systems with
advanced defenses such as (Control Flow Integrity (CFI). Moreover, the Hack@DAC 2018
hardware security competition revealed a protection gap for current chip designs, since
existing verification approaches may fail to detect certain classes of vulnerabilities in RTL
code. In this talk will provide an overview of hardware-assisted security. We will discuss
the impact of deployed solutions, their strengths and shortcomings, as well as new research
directions.
4.12 Challenges of Regulating Security
Christoph Sorge (Universität des Saarlandes, DE)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
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Can legislation help mitigate the “Biggest Failures in Security”? Laws can obviously influence
behaviour, and provide incentives to prioritize security. However, IT security legislation is
hard due to conflicting goals.
Unspecific laws are not very useful. They lead to uncertainty, and even companies trying
to abide by the laws risk fines or civil liability. Too specific regulation is quickly outdated,
and can only cover individual sectors. Instead of detailed ex-ante regulation, liability rules
could be considered as an alternative. Liability, however, also requires an understanding
of obligations (and does not replace this understanding). As a consequence, IT security
regulation usually has a limited scope. The focus can be on a specific sector, or on specific
aspects such as security management and processes.
The German communication platform used for communication between lawyers and
courts (beA) may serve as an example for a failure in security. Its security issues were,
in part, caused by a problematic regulation approach and a resulting lack of requirements
engineering.
To conclude, security legislation may work, as long as its scope is limited, and there are
ways to adapt the legal requirements due to technical innovation. The technical community,
however, should not wish for a detailed and overarching security regulation.
4.13 Fantastic Embedded Security Failures and Where to Find Them.
Lennert Wouters (KU Leuven, BE)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Lennert Wouters
Main reference Lennert Wouters, Eduard Marin, Tomer Ashur, Benedikt Gierlichs, Bart Preneel: “Fast, Furious
and Insecure: Passive Keyless Entry and Start Systems in Modern Supercars”, IACR Trans.
Cryptogr. Hardw. Embed. Syst., Vol. 2019(3), pp. 66–85, 2019.
URL https://doi.org/10.13154/tches.v2019.i3.66-85
During this talk we discuss common security issues encountered in embedded devices.
We take a look at issues ranging from the use of broken cryptographic primitives to
insecure firmware updates and backend API issues. All of these issues are discussed using
several real world examples ranging from vacuum cleaners to high-end cars. The goal of this
talk is to spark discussion on how these issues came to be and how we can prevent them in
the future.
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4.14 Layers of Abstraction and Layers of Obstruction
Moti Yung (Columbia University – New York, US)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
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In this work we argue that what has made the field of “computer science” and its realization
in real life as the “Information Technology Industry” successful, in fact, makes security hard!
The success of computer science evolves around its evolution as a field where “complexity is
controlled”, namely, the ability to abstract sub-problems and sub-fields, solve problems in the
abstracted domain and then apply it to the entire system in the right layer. The ability to
solve concrete specific problems within a layer extends to sub-area, which enables the splitting
of computer science into well defined courses: one can study hardware, computer organization,
architecture, software, operating systems, databases, computer languages, algorithms, etc.
in separate courses, yet in reality computation as a field employs all areas. Well defined
API’s and other mechanisms to connect layers enable also separate companies to deal with a
subarea: hardware, database management system, cloud infrastructure, application package,
which again, in reality work together.
When it comes to the area of security, we have to deal with an external threat, typically
described as a threat model or an adversary. The adversary is an external entity to the
system, hence it does not obey the layering assumption and design methodology: it is going
to attack across layers! Thus, to defend systems practically, the notion of ethical hacking
(white hat and red hat teams) that mimc attacks and itself performs attacks and observations
across layers is typically employed.
We examine how the layers of abstraction, most often obstruct design of security. We ask:
Is practical white hat monitoring and examination the only way to remedy the situation, or
can design be updated to include some cross layers security considerations? We attempt to
examine by example the latter.
The example we use is the development of the “Universal Second Factor” (U2F) by
looking at the small example of servers, additional servers, user, device, and second factor
device. By showing that considering attacks of different elements in the system, and further
measures that are taken to cope with it, a design which is more robust and foils more attacks
can be achieved. It demonstrates a possible refinement methodology, which adds attacks on
other layers, as part of refining a design of a layer, thus being much more robust than merely
considering each layer by itself.
5 Working groups
5.1 Certification Working Group
Felix Freiling (Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, DE) and Begül Bilgin (Rambus – Rotterdam,
NL & KU Leuven, BE)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
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The topic of this working group started out rather fuzzy as a discussion involving “certification,
quantification, liability, responsibility, etc.” in the context of avoiding security failures in
the future, and so the working group started by collecting and sorting out the issues that
19451
16 19451 – Biggest Failures in Security
had motivated the participants to join the group. Participants were asked to provide specific
questions which were subsequently grouped into three main categories:
1. Technical aspects of certification, e.g., how to integrate different perspectives and needs
into the certification process,
2. understanding certificates, e.g., how to formulate the essence of the certified security
properties so that relevant stakeholders can understand them, and
3. the big picture, on how responsibility, liability and regulation work together, e.g., the
usefulness of certification in the absence of quantified risk models, possible civil or criminal
liability for bad security products, or economic incentives for certification.
We aimed to go top down from category 1 to 3, but since a lot of questions from category
1 had been discussed in the talk by Volkmar Lotz on “Security Product Certification” the
discussion started from category 2 with frequent side steps into other categories.
5.1.1 Understanding Certificates
Certification is often confused with penetration testing, a common technique to exhibit
the security of a system in practice. While both topics are related, certification usually
consists of a fixed set of tests that are performed more in the direction of a a checklist, while
in penetration testing a skilled attacker tries to find vulnerabilities with defined resources.
Security certification in terms of Common Criteria, however, is very close to penetration
testing since it required independent analysis, repeatability, and a definition of attackers’
resources.
What is also often confused is that a certificate for some part of a system does not
necessarily imply the security of that part of the system. It always depends on the scope
of the certification and the commitment of the involved parties. For example, if a specific
security parameter (e.g., the ECC curve choice) was not included in the certificate, then
plugging in the wrong security mechanism (the wrong curve) makes the system vulnerable.
In the ideal process of committed certification all stakeholders try to honestly and with true
interest try to raise the security level of a system or product through certification. But in
practice, it is often not clear whether certification is applied in this way. This is exhibited
by the often fierce battle of stakeholders about the scope of certification. A trait often seen
in practice and termed creative certification is to formulate the certification goals in such a
way that they sound good and appear to capture the essence of what is to be proven, but
at second sight fail to follow the spirit of certification. Certifying a product will therefore
often follow the letter of law but lead to no clear increase in security. Even worse, fraudulent
certification tries to misuse the certification process to make certain stakeholders like the
public believe in a security property which was never actually intended to hold.
In this context it is important to understand the concept of a protection profile as defined
in the Common Criteria, which is a carefully crafted statement of the security targets
and the associated resource bounds (cost, etc.) for attackers tailored to a specific class
of systems. The discussions frequently referred to the example of a protection profile for
electronic voting systems developed in Germany by the Federal Information Security Agency
(BSI) which took about 4 years to develop. This is also a general problem in certification:
certification documents must be precise, but they still should be understandable. Today,
many certification documents are dominated by rather mechanical language that is hard to
understand by people who are not from the regulation field. For researchers, for example, it
is often easier to read and understand an evaluation report from an independent evaluator or
white hat hacker that is written more like a research paper.
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Looking at certification in terms of Common Criteria, it was mentioned that certification
appears to work better for hardware than for software. The reasons for this were conjectured
to be (1) the higher complexity of big software systems in contrast to big hardware systems
and (2) the need (or maybe trend) of commercial software for frequent functionality updates.
It was also mentioned that in the context of safety systems, systems are only allowed to
operate in a certified state. The discovery of a security vulnerability puts system operators
in a conflict between safety and security: they may either keep the safety certification of the
system and risk successful attacks, or violate safety considerations due to security updates.
This is a fundamental and still unsolved goal conflict.
5.1.2 Technical Aspects of Certification
As discussed above, the scope of certification is important and is usually described in the
protection profile. In a certain sense, it defines what is “sufficient” to call a system secure.
Perfect security, i.e., the ability to withstand all attacks, if often not the aim. For certain
attacks, other security behaviors can be acceptable. With respect to data protection issues it
was asked whether we can get inspiration from other application areas about what happens
when a software component does not function as it is supposed to or when there are usability
problems, e.g., for a customer to claim the money used to purchase the product.
The newly introduced European data protection legislation GDPR states explicitly that
“state-of-the-art” security evaluation has to be perfomed, but it also mentions the cost factor.
It is often not so clear and debated what this means in practice, and this is also an issue
where the research community needs to take a stand.
Another example is the legislation involving critical infrastructures where also state-of-
the-art certification is often referred to. Such infrastructures are geeting increasingly large.
As an example the infrastrucure to manage millions of autonomous vehicles in the future
was mentioned. There are, however, already examples from this area that were discussed.
For example, trains and the railway system have a long tradition of safety and (partly also)
security evaluation. There, a large system (a complete train system) is divided into pieces
(physical or logical) which should have the same security level and which should follow
standardized functional requirements almost to the point of having a checklist. Problems
arise in the interconnections of these systems because composibility of security properties and
checking for composed requirements are known hard problems. It was discussed in what way
the division into parts could help in the case of updates for already certified devices. One
could try to use isolation properties to update certain parts of the system without affecting
others.
On a technical side, it was asked whether formal verification could not be used to a
larger extent in certification. It was stated that to a certain extent, formal verification is
already part of many certification processes, but in the end the input and the output of a
certification is a document in human language and not in a formal language which could be
used as a basis for formal verification. So generally, a first step in using formal verification in
certification is to formalize the set of security targets appropriately, a hard task in its own.
5.1.3 Liability, Resposibility, and Regulation
We finally turned to the third aspect of the discussion, the big picture involving liability
and regulation. The interplay between these issues and certification was a frequent initial
question since not every product needs security but it appears that everything connected to
the Internet could need some minimal form of security. In this context issues of negligence
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Figure 1 The “ideal world” of certification for security.
were discussed, a term coming from regulation but often introduced into discussions by people
from the research community. However, the question is where does negligence start? The
problem is that there is no common consensus from the security community. It is important
that the security community attempts to interact with the law/regulation community to
have more concrete orientation points.
In practice the incentives for certification are various, some involve regulation necessities
(like critical infrastructures or GDPR) and risks of law suits agains a company, others involve
the risks of bad press and the general problem of naming and shaming that appears to work
sometimes at least.
The certification process as a whole was also questioned: Would it be better in certain
circumstances to not certify a system at all so as to not create any false expectations? Should
we have something more lightweight in-between certification and no certification that is a bit
faster but still understandable? It is not so clear what this could be, alltough it would surely
be better than performing no security evaluation at all. It is however important to raise no
false expectations, as with regular certification. It boils down to knowledge of different levels
of assurance, the target of evaluation and the assumptions that come with the evaluation,
and an understandable message to the end user and other stakeholders.
5.1.4 Summary
When preparing the results of the discussions during the workshop, the authors of this
summary felt that it was easier to summarize the discussed issued based on an understanding
of the ideal world in certification for security (see Figure 1, taken from the presentation). In
this ideal world, there exist widely accepted, appropriate and state-of-the-art security targets
for the system in question that are also openly accessible. Certificates, that are issued by
Frederik Armknecht, Ingrid Verbauwhede, Melanie Volkamer, and Moti Yung 19
trusted and independent testing labs or evaluators, can then refer to these targets to test
the system. Regulators in turn check the practices of the evaluators to avoid fraudulent
certification. In the end, users can then use the system securely.
Obviously, there are many open issues in which the real world differs from the ideal world.
Most critically, a set of “widely accepted, appropriate and state-of-the-art security targets”
does not exist for most systems, especially security targets that contain measures based
on empirical evidence. Furthermore, such security targets are necessary for regulators to
define negligence and enforce liability (and motivate managers to pay for certification). In
turn, certification standardizes such security targets and can be used for “branding” security,
but they still can be misused in the sense of creative and/or fraudulent compliance and
misunderstood. Lastly, independent, professional evaluators with high work ethics are needed
for trustworthy evaluation. This statement is true even independently of certification.
At the end of the discussions we collected a final round of statements on what participants
had taken from the discussions. Here is an unsorted list, that still gives a good insight into
the final mental state of the group:
We need certification but it is unclear how to do this for complex systems.
We need to define meaningful certifications.
Currently, certifications are a marketing thing.
Hardware certification is different from software certification.
I am skeptical about certification.
We need a Dagstuhl seminar on certification for security.
Expectations on certification are too high.
Certification is better than doing nothing.
Certification has limited scope, but what is the scope?
Certificates are necessary.
Certificates shouldn’t lead to blame shifting.
It seems that discussions must continue.
5.2 Education Working Group
Lucy Hunt (Lancaster University, GB), Magnus Almgren (Chalmers University of Technology
– Göteborg, SE), Hervé Debar (Télécom SudParis, FR), Fabio di Franco (ENISA – Attica,
GR), Sven Dietrich (City University of New York, US), Daisuke Fujimoto (Nara Institute
of Science and Technology, JP), Youngwoo Kim (Nara Institute of Science and Technology,
JP), Gabriele Lenzini (University of Luxembourg, LU), Olivier Levillain (Télécom SudParis –
Evry, FR), Lennert Wouters (KU Leuven, BE), and Moti Yung (Columbia University – New
York, US)
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5.2.1 Introduction and Approach
Despite enormous efforts, securing IT systems remain an open challenge for both community
and industry. Prior to the Dagstuhl seminar, participants identified key security failures
and challenges through a “Biggest Failures in Security” survey. From the presented survey
results, the group decided on three strategy areas to explore in smaller working groups:
Certification
Education
Human Factors
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Working group 2, made up of 11 people, explored education as a strategy to the identified
challenges. We reflected that IT security is a multi-disciplinary field, raising questions about
our understanding of the population and diversity of engineers – who are the key stakeholders
that need educating about security? To make an impact through education we have to
understand the audience and effectiveness of channels for sharing and maintaining usable
system security mechanisms, knowledge and best practices. We identified educational goals
for three stakeholder groups:
Formally educated engineers
Non-formally educated engineers
Industry and the general public
We need to better educate and communicate security knowledge to engineers (software,
firmware, hardware, electrical, networking, Internet of Things etc.) that study at university
or take formal training. We also need to find ways to identify and reach non-formally
educated (e.g. self-trained) engineers – there are many more people than before coding (or
such), whose code may have an effect on security. The overarching goal is to make security a
good (and easy) thing to do – from the usability for end users to the security design decisions
engineers make while building systems. Alongside this, we identified the need for societal
change where there is a better understanding, demand and willingness to pay for secure
devices, products and services.
5.2.2 Engineers
For engineers, we discussed the need to:
1. Implement incentives and support for educators to demonstrate secure practices and
behaviors. This means pointing to secure coding standards and verified (or at least
vetted) best practices. In terms of education best practices, successful channels allowed
interaction with incident response teams (source: CERT).
2. Identify and train (retrain) IT professionals in security best practices – in particular
people that haven’t recently or ever been through formal software engineering education,
are self-taught software engineers or come in from different fields. All have a need
for security resources, training and support. We identified examples of local security
education initiatives (CyberEdu in France, Seccap in Japan), the challenge is how to
scale globally and so reach larger audiences. We reflected on certification schemes and
organisational responsibility for security – as working group 1 were looking at this we
parked that discussion.
3. Find ways to attract and train new people into security roles. Security practitioners are
sometimes seen as “getting in the way” of the software development life cycle, if security
has not been properly integrated into the process previously.
4. Develop better code re-use opportunities, to take advantage of engineer laziness (cut and
paste of code samples). To make good practices more accessible, while trying to eradicate
bad examples from the publicly available online resources.
We identified a number of solutions, focusing on helping engineers to identify best practices
(rather than common practices):
1. Creating tools (e.g. compilers) and methods to make it easier to do the good/right
thing. We need software development tools that make security an integral part. Both the
creation of more secure code as well as providing feedback to the programmer (software
engineer) to transparently move forward with enhancing security aspects are needed.
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2. Designing better security mechanisms for engineers, that improve usability for the users.
Engineers need to work closely with usability experts to allow better interaction of the
users with the hardware devices and their associated operating systems and application
software.
3. Teaching engineers how to design user interfaces that help get security concepts across to
users. Early studies going back to 1999 showed challenges and confusion when it comes
to security concepts. An interdisciplinary approach is needed in training engineers to
convey the right ideas. Sample best practices and positive feedback would help reinforce
this approach.
4. Enhancing code sharing platforms (such as the web site Stack Overflow): new voting for
“best practice secure” answers and code samples so that less experienced programmers
understand the choices they make when copying and pasting shared code. By providing
accessible and vetted code samples, designs, or approaches, best secure practices would
be promoted, while making sure the engineers understand why that choice was made.
5. Industry incentives: “follow these practices – we will rank your app higher”. A reward
mechanism with software repositories, such as Apple App Store or Google Play Store for
mobile and desktop software, could issue a higher ranking for developers that adhere to
best practices.
5.2.3 Industry and Public
For industry and the wider public, we need to:
capture and share IT failures and consequences – to exploit failures and raise awareness
find approaches to better demonstrate security – to experts, industry and wider society
motivate people to value and prioritize security requirements
We discussed initiatives for the wider engagement and awareness raising within society
including better publicity of vulnerabilities and associated real life failure and success stories
– how do we capture and learn from our mistakes? Can the need for security be compared to
the climate change movement – can we use society to drive changes?
5.2.4 Further Questions
Other questions raised for further discussion:
1. What has been the impact of GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) on secure
coding practices?
2. Regarding workplace incentives and measures – what metrics are there for secure practices?
3. How has the population and diversity of (software) engineers changed?
4. Is education really failing us in security – how to measure the success and impact of
security education?
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5.3 Human Factors Working Group
Joachim Meyer (Tel Aviv University, IL), Robert Biddle (Carleton University – Ottawa, CA),
Sebastian Pape (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, DE), Kazue Sako (NEC – Kawasaki,
JP), Martina Angela Sasse (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, DE), Stephan Somogyi (Google Inc. –
Mountain View, US), Borce Stojkovski (University of Luxembourg, LU), Ingrid Verbauwhede
(KU Leuven, BE), and Yuval Yarom (University of Adelaide, AU)
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The seminar provided a group of participants with different academic and employment
backgrounds with the opportunity to learn and to reflect about what might be the greatest
failures and threats in security today. Our specific group dealt with the roles humans and
human behavior have in security. The work is based on the premise that the introduction
of threats into systems often results from human actions, which may be inadvertent (e.g.,
the opening of an infected email attachment) or may be deliberate risk taking (e.g., the
override of a certificate warning about a site). The group spent several hours discussing
ways to address the issue of human involvement in threats. It became clear that this is a
complex, multilayered problem, that still warrants a comprehensive conceptual analysis. The
group started to discuss the possibility of writing a “cybersecurity harm-reduction manifesto”
that would be a synthesis of the different positions brought by the members of the group.
In particular, the idea would be to apply ideas from public health by making efforts at a
broad level to reduce real harm, rather than offloading the responsibility onto individual
users, stigmatizing human behavior and blaming users for any failures.
Major points that arose in the discussions include:
1. Humans are involved in systems in various, often very different capacities (developers,
system administrators, security experts, end users, etc.). The knowledge, preferences,
and attitudes towards security issues may differ greatly between these groups.
2. The dealing with threats can take various forms, and it is not clear under which conditions,
which approach might be best. For instance, one can aim to design out the possibility of
threats materializing, one can lower the harm that may be done if a threat materialized,
one can train people to detect and cope intelligently with threats, etc. It is not clear how
realistic the adoption of different approaches will be to deal with different threats.
3. We still lack well-substantiated knowledge about the effectiveness of different risk-reduction
methods. Intuitive approaches (e.g., force users to have very long passwords, which need
to be changed every few weeks) often fail to provide the desired results.
4. Security-related behavior is part of a person’s interaction with the system. The person’s
perceptions of risks and the adequacy of different behaviors, the estimates of costs and
benefits of different outcomes, and the user’s mental model of the system and its security
all affect the user’s actions and choices. The design of secure systems will also require
the design of the interactions that support secure behavior.
5. We still lack theoretical tools to predict the effects, changes in the system, the threats,
the environment or the user may have on risk-related behaviors. A major challenge for
the scientific work in this field will be to develop and validate such tools.
These points demonstrate the wealth of topics that were discussed and that need to be
considered when dealing with the human aspects of security threats and failures. The
Dagstuhl seminar can serve as a starting point for discussions and the development of joint
research on this broad topic.
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